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the law of the case and was therefore binding upon all courts
of co-ordinate jurisdiction. 35
The court's refusal to sanction this procedure, which involves,
in effect, taking an appeal to a justice sitting in the same court,
is supported by the tenor of CPLR 2221 and 2217(a). These
sections provide that "any motion may be referred to a judge
who decided a prior motion in the action," 136 and that a motion
affecting a prior order "shall be made . . . to the judge who
signed the order. .
. A motion made to other than a proper
judge under this rule shall be transferred to the proper judge." 137
While the above cited sections did not bind the court in this
situation, they evidence a legislative intention to prohibit the procedure employed by the petitioner in the instant case.
ARTICLE 26CPLR 2606:

PROPERTY PAID INTO COURT

Obtaining order for payment out of court.

The application for obtaining a court order for the payment
of property previously paid into court can be made either by
motion or by special proceeding." s In the case of Application of
Godfrey,' 39 the petitioner utilized the special proceeding. The
court considered this procedure preferable because the courtdesignated custodian, the county treasurer, no longer had possession
of the property but had erroneously released the money to the
state comptroller and thus was not a party to the application. As
a result of this voluntary relinquishment, the supreme court noted
that although the order withdrawing the funds should emanate
1 40
from the court which directed that the property be paid into court,'
here, the action of the treasurer removed it from the exclusive
control of the county court and thus allowed the supreme court to
assume jurisdiction. Although CPLR 2606 and 2607 require the
petitioner to show that he is the person entitled to payment, it
does not specify the manner of proof formerly required by RCP
5
13
Id. at 489, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
136 CPLR 2 217(a).
137 CPLR 2221.
138 CPLR 2606. The purpose of this rule and rule 2607 is to prevent

the property from being released upon unlawful claims.
County of
Tompkins v. Ingersoll, 81 App. Div. 344, 347, 81 N.Y. Supp. 242, 245-46

(3d Dep't 1903), aff'd, 177 N.Y. 543, 69 N.E. 1132 (1904).
1390 46 Misc. 2d 452, 259 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1965).

46Zirinsky v. Pesce, 188 Misc. 539, 68 N.Y.S2d 309 (N.Y. City Ct.
1947); People v. Brown, 83 Misc. 495, 146 N.Y. Supp. 123 (Sup. Ct.
1914). This procedure is continued under CPLR 2606 (2). See 2 WEIxsTEI,
KORN & MrnLLm, Nmv YoRK Cnim PRAcrncE [2606.01 (1964).
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31.141 The revisers considered such a specification unnecessary
since, if consent is required, it may be
42 proved when the motion
is made or in the special proceeding.
The instant case, although not substantially altering established
practice, presents a good illustration of the operation of the
CPLR in this area.
ARTICLE

CPLR 3011:

30-

REMEDIES AND PLEADING

Counterclaim not permitted in plaintiff's reply.

Under Section 272 of the Civil Practice Act, a plaintiff's reply
43
to a counterclaim was generally limited to denials or defenses.
Thus, the plaintiff could not, in his reply, interpose an affirmative
cause of action against the defendant. The First Report of the
Advisory Committee declared that "there is no provision for the
assertion of a crossclaim or counterclaim by a plaintiff in a reply." 14
CPLR 3011 provides that "there shall be a reply to a counterclaim."
Whether or not a counterclaim could be contained in a reply under
CPLR 3011, however, was not judicially resolved until Habiby
4
v. Habiby."'
In Habiby, the defendant moved to strike certain items from
the plaintiff's reply, one of which was, in effect, a counterclaim.
Granting the defendant's motion, the appellate division held that
CPLR 3011 does not call for a departure from the old rule which
prohibited the pleading of a counterclaim in a reply.
In spite of the fact that the court seems to have discretionary
power to allow the assertion of a counterclaim in a reply, 46 if
the plaintiff wants to assert a new cause of action against the defendant the proper procedure is to move to amend his original
complaint under CPLR 3025(b). He thus has an ample procedural tool to assert additional claims; he does not need the
reply as a means of asserting them.

'41 Rule 31 required an acknowledgment of a consent to the payment and
proof of identity of the applicant by some other person. See 2 WEINSTEIN,
KORN
& M.LER, Nav YORK CIVIL PRAcnrcn ff2606.04 (1964).
42
3 TEam REP. 418.
143 E.g., Seligmann v. Mandel, 19 Misc. 2d 418, 190 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup.
Ct. 1959) ; Phillips v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 175 Misc. 1009, 26 N.Y.S.2d
58 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 946, 27 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1st Dep't
1941).
144 FRST REP. 71.
'45 23 App. Div. 2d 558, 256 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1st Dep't 1965).
146 Cf. CPLR 3011. "There shall be no other pleading unless the court
orders otherwise." Ibid.

